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Why does ingroup essentialism increase prejudice
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3Measurement Center, Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
4School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
A study with British participants (N¼ 90) tested a potential mediator of the effect of essentialist beliefs aboutthe national ingroup on prejudice against immigrants. Essentialist beliefs were defined as beliefs in genetic
determinism, a basic assumption that group membership is ‘‘written in the blood’’ and that the groups’
boundaries and characteristics are determined by genetic and/or biological factors. Essentialist beliefs were
expected to play an important role in the formation of prejudice. They were predicted to be associated with a
reduction in the perceived possibility of immigrants’ adopting the mainstream culture. Further, it was expected
that essentialist beliefs would be positively associated with perceptions of intergroup threat, which in turn would
be associated with a stronger demand for immigrants adopting the mainstream culture. Taken together,
essentialist beliefs were predicted to be associated with a greater discrepancy between the demand for and
perceived feasibility of culture adoption. This discrepancy was hypothesized to mediate the effect of essentialist
beliefs on prejudice against immigrants. Structural equation modeling analysis and mediation analysis supported
the hypotheses, showing that essentialism attributed to the national ingroup results in people demanding
something seemingly impossible from immigrants, and that this situation in which immigrants have little chance
of fulfilling majority members’ expectations results in prejudice against them. Thus, results show that perceptions
of the ingroup are associated with attitudes to the outgroup, and they outline an explanatory mechanism for the
positive correlation between essentialism and prejudice which has been found in previous research. Theoretical
and applied implications are discussed.
Keywords: Essentialism; Prejudice; Minority members.
U ne e´tude aupre`s de participants britanniques (N¼ 90) examine un me´diateur potentiel de l’effet descroyances essentialistes concernant l’endogroupe national sur les pre´juge´s envers les immigrants. Les
croyances essentialistes sont de´finies comme des croyances en un de´terminisme ge´ne´tique, une hypothe`se de base
voulant que l’appartenance a` un groupe est «e´crite dans le sang» et que les limites et les caracte´ristiques des
groupes sont de´termine´es par la ge´ne´tique et/ou par des facteurs biologiques. On s’attend a` ce que les croyances
essentialistes jouent un roˆle important dans la formation de pre´juge´s. Il est pre´dit qu’elles soient associe´es a` une
re´duction de la possibilite´ pour les immigrants d’adopter la culture dominante. De plus, il est pre´vu que les
croyances essentialistes soient associe´es positivement aux perceptions de menace intergroupe, qui a` leur tour
seraient associe´es a` une plus forte demande d’adoption de la culture dominante par les immigrants. Dans
l’ensemble, on s’attend a` ce que les croyances essentialistes soient associe´es a` une plus grande discordance entre la
demande et la faisabilite´ perc¸ue d’une adoption de la culture. Selon l’hypothe`se, cette discordance me´diatise l’effet
des croyances essentialistes sur les pre´juge´s envers les immigrants. L’analyse par mode´lisation en e´quations
structurelles et l’analyse de me´diation soutiennent les hypothe`ses, indiquant que l’essentialisme attribue´ a`
l’endogroupe national entraıˆne les gens a` demander quelque chose d’apparemment impossible aux immigrants, et
que cette situation, dans laquelle les immigrants ont peu de chances de re´pondre aux attentes de la majorite´,
entraıˆne des pre´juge´s envers eux. Ainsi, les re´sultats montrent que les perceptions de l’endogroupe sont associe´es a`
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des attitudes envers l’exogroupe et ils soulignent un me´canisme explicatif de la corre´lation positive entre
l’essentialisme et les pre´juge´s de´ja` trouve´e dans les recherches ante´rieures. Les implications the´oriques et
pratiques sont discute´es.
U na investigacio´n con participantes brita´nicos (N¼ 90) puso a prueba un mediador potencial del efecto delas creencias esencialistas acerca de un subgrupo nacional sobre los prejuicios contra los inmigrantes. Las
creencias esencialistas se definieron como las creencias en un determinismo gene´tico, una suposicio´n ba´sica que
sostiene que la pertenencia al grupo esta´ ‘‘escrita en la sangre’’, y que los lı´mites y caracterı´sticas del grupo esta´n
determinados por factores gene´ticos y/o biolo´gicos. Se piensa que las creencias esencialistas tienen una funcio´n
importante en la formacio´n de prejuicios. Se predijo que iban a estar asociadas con la reduccio´n de la posibilidad
percibida de que los inmigrantes adopten la cultura predominante. Adema´s, se esperaba que las creencias
esencialistas tengan una asociacio´n positiva con la percepcio´n de amenazas intergrupales, que a su vez estarı´a
asociada con una demanda ma´s fuerte para que los inmigrantes adopten la cultura predominante. Tomadas en
conjunto, se predijo que las creencias esencialistas esta´n asociadas a una mayor discrepancia entre la demanda y
la viabilidad percibida de la adopcio´n cultural. Se hipotetizo´ que esa discrepancia medio´ el efecto de las creencias
esencialistas sobre el prejuicio contra los inmigrantes. El ana´lisis de modelado de ecuaciones estructurales y el
ana´lisis de mediacio´n apoyaron la hipo´tesis, mostrando que el esencialismo atribuido a los resultados del
subgrupo nacional exigı´a algo pra´cticamente imposible de los inmigrantes, y que esta situacio´n, en la cual los
inmigrantes tienen poca probabilidad de cumplir las expectativas de la mayorı´a de los miembros, resulta en
prejuicios contra ellos.
Nations vary in terms of popular perceptions of
what determines group membership (Smith, 2001).
While membership in some countries is defined
mainly in civic terms, in others it is delineated
along ethnic principles. There are also variations
between members of the same country in terms of
how strongly they endorse different conceptualiza-
tions of nationhood. Such intracountry differences
in self-definition can be observed to covary
systematically with other political attitudes, nota-
bly attitudes to immigration and immigrants. A
common pattern is that those people who endorse
the notion of blood citizenship are also those who
tend to be sceptical toward ethnic minority groups
(Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). This paper
aims to explain this association by highlighting a
mediator for the effect of modes of national self-
definition on prejudice against immigrants. In
other words, it will examine why the endorsement
of essentialist beliefs regarding the national
ingroup might increase prejudice against
immigrants.
Ethnic nationalism, which defines group mem-
bership in terms of blood (Smith, 2001), is one
specific form of psychological essentialism. This
phenomenon has been defined by Yzerbyt, Rocher,
and Schadron (1997) as a belief that all members of
a social category have an essential feature in
common; that category memberships are immuta-
ble; that inferences about members of the category
can be easily made; that features of category
members can be interpreted in light of a unifying
theme; and that category membership is exclusive.
Other definitions of essentialism exist (e.g., Medin
& Ortony, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).
Despite some theoretical differences, theorists
agree that essentialism is a belief that things are
defined by an underlying essence, and when applied
to social categories these are often treated as if
they were natural kinds with discrete
well-defined borders, intracategory homogeneity,
mutual exclusivity, and unalterability (see,
e.g., Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006;
Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Kashima
et al., 2005).
Although essentialist beliefs can theoretically
pertain to any category, we are interested in how
individuals apply them to their national ingroup in
the form of ethnic nationalism (see also Pehrson
et al., 2009). Therefore, like Denson, Lickel,
Curtis, Stenstrom, and Ames (2006), we use the
term ‘‘essentialism’’ to refer only to beliefs about
natural kinds with strong biological connotations
and not to beliefs about entitativity. Our focus is
on the biological component of psychological
essentialism, as expressed in lay theories of genetic
determinism (for a similar focus, see Keller, 2005).
Ethnic nationalism defines national group mem-
bership as something immutable that is based on
quasibiological (blood/genetic/hereditary) connec-
tions between category members (Smith, 2001).
People who subscribe to this view believe that
group membership is inherited and attainable only
through belonging to a certain blood line, that it
has a natural (genetic or other biological) basis,
and that it is unchangeable and stable (Zagefka,
Pehrson, Mole, & Chan, 2010). Such beliefs have
wide-reaching implications for how individuals
perceive their ingroup and relevant outgroups
(Verkuyten, 2004), although these beliefs are not
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necessary justified or based on fact (Zagefka,
2009).
Essentialism has often been found to be
associated with political attitudes. It has been
linked to right-wing authoritarianism (Haslam &
Levy, 2006), social dominance orientation (Keller,
2005; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994),
and political conservatism (Haslam & Levy, 2006;
Keller, 2005; Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984).
Furthermore, it is also associated with opinions on
topics that are pertinent to the issue of immigra-
tion directly, such as a rejection of multicultural-
ism (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004; see also No et al.,
2008), stereotyping (Bastian & Haslam, 2006;
Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Levy, Stoessner, &
Dweck, 1998), and prejudice against ethnic out-
group members (Allport, 1954; Bastian & Haslam,
2008; Epstein Jayaratne et al., 2006; Keller, 2005;
Morton, Hornsey, & Postmes, 2009; but see
Haslam et al., 2002; Verkuyten, 2003, for some
important qualifications to this general pattern).
Research on the strategic use of essentialism has
demonstrated that prejudice can inform the
endorsement of essentialist beliefs (Morton et al.,
2009). However, it has also been suggested that
essentialism itself impacts on intergroup attitudes
and specifically prejudice (see e.g. Bastian &
Haslam, 2006). We hypothesize that one reason
why essentialism is linked to increased prejudice
against immigrants might have to do with the
discrepancy between the perceived feasibility of,
and demand for, immigrants adopting the majority
culture.
Upon arrival in a new country, immigrants can
choose to maintain (or not) their original culture.
Similarly, they can choose to adopt (or not) the
mainstream culture (Zagefka & Brown, 2002).
These are often called acculturative strategies, and
they are commonly thought of as orthogonal
choices (Berry, 1997). Of course, it is not only
immigrants who will have certain views about the
merits of culture maintenance and/or culture
adoption; majority members will also often have
preferences about how they want immigrants to
live (Zagefka & Brown, 2002).
Own preferences of minority and majority
groups, and each group’s perceptions of what the
other group wants, as well as the interplay between
the two have received considerable research atten-
tion in the past (Brown & Zagefka, 2011).
However, what has not been studied to date is
the perceived feasibility of culture adoption and
maintenance. We believe that particularly the
perceived feasibility of culture adoption will be
relevant when examining the impact of essentialist
beliefs on attitudes to immigrants.
The fact that essentialist beliefs are related to
acculturative choices has been demonstrated for
minority members (No et al., 2008). We propose
that essentialist beliefs are also related to the
acculturation strategies that majority members
demand from minority members, and in the
following we will outline what might be expected
of the effect of essentialism on acculturation
choices and their perceived feasibility. In a nut-
shell, it is proposed that essentialist beliefs will
decrease the perceived feasibility of culture adop-
tion. Simultaneously, essentialist beliefs are
hypothesized to increase perceived identity threat,
and perceived identity threat is in turn expected to
increase the demand for culture adoption. The
resulting discrepancy between the demand for and
perceived possibility of culture adoption, in turn, is
expected to be associated with prejudice.
Focusing first on the effects of essentialism on
feasibility of culture adoption, the endorsement of
an essentialist ideology should decrease the per-
ceived ease of ‘‘becoming British.’’ After all, if
Britishness is seen as only attainable through
descent, it should not appear possible to become
British through other means. Those high in
essentialism will see the British culture and way
of living as an expression of something that has a
deep biological basis. Hence, although they might
concede that immigrants can try to ‘‘mimic’’ the
British way of life, they will still believe that
immigrants cannot truly be, act, or live in an
authentically British way, because this is seen as
only possible for white Anglo-Saxons.
Furthermore, essentialism can be expected to
increase perceived identity threat. As suggested in
Zagefka and colleagues (2010), those who define
their ingroup in essentialist terms will perceive
group boundaries to be more clear-cut, more rigid,
and less permeable, and they will also defend the
idea that group boundaries should be so. In other
words, ethnic nationalist beliefs are both descrip-
tive and normative. Therefore, essentialists should
be more concerned with trespassing and contam-
ination of the ingroups’ essence by outsiders. It is
hypothesized that this concern with trespassing
and contamination will increase perceived identity
threat for the following reason. People who are
preoccupied with protecting their ingroup’s iden-
tity might be expected to guard it more vigilantly,
and to be more sensitive to potential violations.
Put simply, people are more likely to detect a
threat (whether founded in fact or imaginary) if
they are looking for it because they are concerned
about it. They will have a more finely attuned
radar for threatening information. Because of this,
essentialists should be more concerned with
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protecting the ingroup from outside threats and
fearful of changes to the ingroup due to alien
influences. They should be more sensitive to, and
therefore perceive more, symbolic threat (Stephan
& Stephan, 2000) to the ingroup’s values, beliefs
and traditions.
Perceived identity threat, in turn, might be
associated with more demands for culture adop-
tion. The idea that perceived threat will have a
negative impact on attitudes that are generally
liberal and permissive and allow minority members
to retain their separate identity, such as in multi-
culturalism and integration, has been proposed
repeatedly within the field (e.g. Zagefka, Tip,
Gonza´lez, Brown, & Cinnirella, 2012). Generally,
under conditions of threat majority members are
less likely to support multiculturalism, and more
inclined to reject the notion that minorities with
separate identities are welcome. For example, Tip,
Zagefka, Gonza´lez, Brown, and Cinnirella (2012)
found that a perception among majority members
that minority members want to maintain their
culture was positively associated with perceived
threat, and perceived threat in turn was negatively
associated with endorsement of multiculturalism.
Because of these negative effects of threat on
tolerance towards cultural diversity, we expected
in the present context too that threat might
increase the demand that minority members
adopt the majority culture. After all, a natural
reaction to threat is wanting to get rid of the
source of the threat, and immigrants turning into
Britons is a very effective way of annihilating the
source of the threat.
Of course, threat might not only be associated
with more demand for culture adoption, but also
with a range of other responses, such as a demand
for the immigrants to leave. Indeed, such responses
might often occur simultaneously, and in the
acculturation field it has long been acknowledged
that certain acculturation preferences, such as a
desire for assimilation and separation, might not
be as orthogonal as the theory would propose and
that they might indeed be interrelated in rather
more complex ways (Van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz,
& Feltzer, 1999). However, in the present context
we were not interested in these other responses, but
merely in the effect of threat on demand for culture
adoption, since this variable is the one crucial for
the discrepancy between what is desired and what
is perceived as feasible by those who adhere to
essentialist views.
Summing up the processes described so far, it is
suggested that essentialist beliefs will increase the
demand that immigrants do something which is
perceived to be impossible. While the proposed
bivariate effects of essentialism on threat, and of
threat on demand for cultural adoption, seem
quite straightforward, the resulting sequence of
proposed events is somewhat perplexing.
Essentialists are less likely to perceive culture
adoption as viable. At the same time, they are
more likely to feel threatened by immigrants
(because they fear and are more likely to detect
‘‘dilution’’ of their ingroup) and because of this
perceived threat they might ironically be keener on
immigrants becoming British as a consequence. So,
essentialism might have the paradoxical double
effect of simultaneously decreasing the perceived
possibility that immigrants become British, but
increasing the demand that they should do exactly
that (via threat).
We now turn to the hypothesis that a discre-
pancy between what is perceived as feasible and
what is demanded will increase prejudice. It is
assumed that wanting something that cannot be
delivered is a frustrating experience. In fact, one
can define ‘‘frustration’’ as a state of having the
fulfillment of one’s desire prevented. From
Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears’
(1939) frustration–aggression hypothesis onwards,
it has been suggested that frustration necessarily
leads to some form of aggression. This aggression
can take the shape of intergroup violence
(Hovland & Sears, 1940) or might be evident in a
milder incarnation as increased prejudice (Cowen,
Landes, & Schaet, 1958). On this basis, it can be
assumed that people will dislike those whom they
perceive as incapable of fulfilling their desires.
Having one’s demands frustrated is an adverse
experience, and people will be negatively inclined
towards those they perceive to be responsible for
this negative state. Therefore, it is the discrepancy
between the perceived possibility of culture adop-
tion and the demand for it that can explain the
negative effect of essentialist beliefs on prejudice
against immigrants. Translating this idea into a
hypothesis about mean levels, this means that
those participants who score high on essentialism
(rather than low) would also manifest greater
discrepancies between feasibility of and demand
for culture adoption. Importantly, we do not
expect essentialism to impact on the relationship
between feasibility and demand, but on the
divergence between the two.
Overall, it was expected that essentialist beliefs
would be associated with a reduction in the
perceived possibility of immigrants’ adopting the
mainstream culture. Further, it was expected that
essentialist beliefs would be associated with more
perception of threat, which in turn would be
associated with a stronger demand for
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culture adoption. Taken together, essentialist
beliefs were predicted to be associated with a
stronger discrepancy between the demand for and
perceived feasibility of culture adoption. It is this
discrepancy that was hypothesized to mediate the
effect of essentialist beliefs on prejudice. These
hypotheses were tested in Britain, focusing on
attitudes to Pakistani immigrants. This immigrant
group was chosen because it constitutes a sizeable
minority in the UK, and one that is currently very
salient due to recent Islamophobic trends.
METHOD
Participants
Ninety students participated in the study as part of
their course requirements (65 female, 22 male,
3 unspecified; mean age 24.08 years). All partici-
pants self-reported to be of British nationality.
Procedure and measures
Data collection was accomplished by means of an
electronic questionnaire available via the Internet
and advertised to volunteer participants on the
Intranet pages of a university in the South-East of
England. The study was advertised as a survey of
social attitudes.
To measure essentialist beliefs, we relied on
measures used by Pehrson et al. (2009).
Participants answered the following questions on
a seven-point Likert-type scale (1¼ totally disagree
to 7¼ totally agree): It is the British blood that
makes British people who they are; A person can
be British, even if their parents came from another
country and are not British (reverse-scored); Who
and how the British are is determined largely by
the British biological heritage; Genetic factors
largely determine the British character; One’s
ancestry does not make a person British (reverse-
scored); Throughout history, the British character
has been defined by something in the blood; Their
shared blood membership makes British people
want to stick together; What makes a British
person British isn’t in the blood (reverse-scored); If
someone has British parents then this person is
automatically British too, even if he/she has never
been to the UK and if he/she does not speak any
English. The scale had good internal reliability,
with Cronbach’s a¼ .81.
To measure the perceived possibility of culture
adoption, participants answered the following
questions (1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally
agree): With time, Pakistani immigrants can
become truly British if they want to; Pakistani
immigrants can take on the British culture;
Pakistani immigrants can take on the British way
of living; a¼ .74.
To measure the demand for culture adoption,
participants answered the following questions
(1¼ totally disagree to 7¼ totally agree):
Pakistani immigrants should become truly
British; Pakistani immigrants should take on the
British culture; Pakistani immigrants should take
on the British way of living; a¼ .85.
To measure perceived identity threat, partici-
pants answered the following questions (1¼ totally
disagree to 7¼ totally agree): I think that essential
aspects of the British culture will be weakened
because of the high number of Pakistani immi-
grants in Britain; Because of the high number of
Pakistani immigrants, the British people will lose
their values; Because of the high number of
Pakistani immigrants, the British people will lose
their cultural traditions; I believe that the high
number of Pakistani immigrants will influence my
own way of living; The high number of Pakistani
immigrants might change the main religion in the
UK; a¼ .83.
The measure of prejudice had a heavy ‘‘social
distance’’ element because this concept has been
frequently used as a component of prejudice
measures (Pettigrew &Meertens, 1995). It captures
the behavioral intention aspect of prejudice, a
reluctance to enter into social relationships with
outgroup members. Items were: I would not like it
if the majority of people in my class were Pakistani;
Sometimes I think this country would be better off
if there were fewer Pakistanis; The problems that
the Pakistanis face are because of the way they are;
I would not have any problems with having a
Pakistani girlfriend/boyfriend (reverse-scored); I
would not like having a Pakistani boss or teacher;
I would feel uncomfortable if a Pakistani sat beside
me on the bus; a¼ .80.
Participants also completed some other items,
such as questions about their age and sex, and they
indicated what they considered to be their nation-
ality and ethnicity. All aspects of the research
complied with the ethical guidelines of the British
Psychological Society and the American
Psychological Association.
RESULTS
Descriptive analyses
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correla-
tions are displayed in Table 1. The mean score for
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each variable fell slightly below the middle of each
scale, with good variability on all variables. The
pattern of bivariate correlations is in line with
what might be expected.
Do essentialist beliefs simultaneously
decrease the perceived possibility of
culture adaption and increase the
demand for it through the increase of
identity threat?
A path analysis was conducted with structural
equation modeling (SEM), using the EQS software.
‘‘Essentialist beliefs’’ were specified to predict both
the ‘‘perceived possibility of culture adoption’’ and
‘‘perceived identity threat.’’ ‘‘Identity threat.’’ in
turn, was specified to predict the ‘‘demand for
culture adoption.’’ The model fitted the data
well, w2(3)¼ 5.95, ns; CFI¼ .96; GFI¼ .97;
SRMR¼ .06. As can be seen in Figure 1, all the
individual paths were significant and in the
hypothesized direction. Furthermore, ‘‘essentialist
beliefs’’ had a significant indirect effect on
‘‘demand for culture adoption,’’ z¼ 3.82, p5 .001.
Additional confirmation in favour of the
hypothesis was sought by running an alternative
model, with the aim of demonstrating that this
would have a worse fit with the data than the
hypothesized model. To this end, an analysis was
conducted where all paths of the original model
were reversed (so that ‘‘demand’’ now predicted
‘‘threat,’’ and ‘‘threat’’ and ‘‘perceived possibility’’
both predicted ‘‘essentialist beliefs’’). As expected,
this alternative model fitted the data considerably
less well, thereby yielding further support for the
hypothesis, w2(3)¼ 15.59, p5 .002; CFI¼ .82;
GFI¼ .92; SRMR¼ .15.
Does the discrepancy between what is
perceived as possible and what is
demanded increase prejudice?
The results of the SEM analyses demonstrate that
essentialist beliefs are simultaneously associated
negatively with the perceived possibility of culture
adaption, and positively with the demand for it. In
other words, they are positively related to the
discrepancy between what is perceived as possible
and desirable. According to the hypothesis, want-
ing immigrants to do the impossible will be
associated with prejudice, because people will
dislike those whom they perceive as incapable of
meeting their wishes.
To test this hypothesis fully, an index of the
discrepancy between perceived feasibility of and
demand for culture adoption was devised, by
subtracting the former from the latter. Values on
this index range from 6 to 6. The midpoint of the
scale is zero, which signifies no discrepancy
between what is perceived as possible and desir-
able. Positive values express a perception that
culture adoption is perceived as more desirable
than it is possible. Negative values express a
perception that culture adoption is less desirable
than possible. Therefore, positive values indicate a
problematic situation, where something unfeasible
is demanded; i.e., where the impossible is
demanded from immigrants. In contrast, negative
values suggest a less problematic state, where
something is not demanded even though it is
perceived to be theoretically possible. In other
words, the top end of this scale corresponds to the
most problematic discrepancy.
TABLE 1
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the measured variables
1 2 3 4 5
1. Essentialist beliefs
2. Perceived possibility of culture adoption .44***
3. Demand for culture adoption .34*** .14
4. Perceived identity threat .49*** .37*** .51***
5. Prejudice .61*** .45*** .49*** .67***
Mean 3.23 3.50 3.98 3.33 2.79
Standard deviation .97 1.08 1.49 1.31 1.09
***p5 001.
 
 
 
 
Essentialist 
beliefs 
Perceived possibility of  
culture adoption 
Perceived identity
threat
Demand for 
culture 
adoption
 
-.44 ***  
.49 ***  .51 *** 
Figure 1. Essentialist beliefs simultaneously decrease the
perceived possibility of culture adaption and increase the
demand for it.
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A quick note on discrepancy scores should be
added. These are sometimes criticized for bringing
about a measure of interpretational ambiguity,
because the same resulting discrepancy value can
be derived in different ways (e.g. 6–2¼ 4; 7–3¼ 4;
5–1¼ 4). However, because the present prediction
concerned precisely the hypothesized effect of a
mismatch between what is perceived as desirable
on one hand and feasible on the other, a difference
score seemed—albeit imperfect—the most direct
operationalization of this concept. An alternative
would have been to use double-barrelled items
(e.g., ‘‘I believe immigrants should become British
even though I do not believe they are able to do
this’’). Because such items bring with them their
own—and in our view more grave—measurement
theoretical problems, we settled on the difference
score as the better alternative.
To test directly whether the discrepancy between
demand and feasibility would mediate the effect of
essentialist beliefs on prejudice, Baron and
Kenny’s (1986) method was employed. According
to this, three conditions need to be fulfilled to
demonstrate mediation: (1) The independent vari-
able must significantly predict the mediator; (2) the
independent variable must significantly predict the
dependent variable; and (3) when independent
variable and mediator predict the dependent
variable simultaneously, the effect of the indepen-
dent variable must be significantly reduced and the
mediator must still exert a significant effect.
As illustrated in Figure 2, all three conditions
were met. Displayed are beta weights generated in
regression analyses for predicting each target
variable. The two values in italics pertain to the
analysis which incorporates two predictors (testing
the third condition). The Sobel test confirmed that
the drop from .61 to .39 was indeed a significant
decrease, z¼ 3.51, p5 .001. In other words, the
analysis confirmed that the effect of essentialist
beliefs on prejudice was—as predicted—partially
mediated by ‘‘discrepancy.’’
DISCUSSION
Clear evidence was yielded that the effect of
essentialist beliefs about one’s national ingroup
on prejudice against immigrants is at least partially
mediated by an increased discrepancy between a
demand for, and the perceived possibility of,
culture adoption on the part of the immigrants.
As such, the current contribution further illumi-
nates some of the effects of essentialism on
prejudice previously highlighted in the literature
(e.g., Keller, 2005), by testing what the documen-
ted association between the two variables might be
mediated by. Essentialism had the ironic effect of
being simultaneously negatively associated with
the perceived feasibility of culture adaption, but
positively associated with the demand for it
(the latter mediated by threat). Unsurprisingly,
dislike for immigrants was higher the more
immigrants were perceived to be unable to fulfill
one’s wishes.
We believe these findings are exciting for several
reasons. Firstly, although previous research has
demonstrated that essentialism covaries system-
atically with political opinions and intergroup
attitudes, little work to date has tried to get to
the bottom of this by answering the why question;
i.e., by examining mediators. We do not mean to
suggest that ‘‘discrepancy’’ will be the only
important mediating factor, and others might be
highlighted by future work. Undoubtedly, it will
be important to consider the variables highlighted
by Stephan and Stephan (2000), such as intergroup
anxiety. We do, however, hope that this paper can
help to highlight the importance of trying to
explain some of the associations that have
previously been reported in the literature, and
stimulate further research.
Secondly, this work is the first one to highlight
the importance of researching the perceived
feasibility of different acculturation choices. This
is a novel concept that has not received attention
in the acculturation literature to date. Others have
noted that one should not only analyze minority
and majority members’ demands, but also what
they actually put into practice (Navas, Rojas,
Garcia, & Pumares, 2007). The construct of what
is perceived as feasible has not been highlighted,
however, and one could speculate that it is just as
important, if not more so, as what is demanded
from and what is practiced by minority members.
One can imagine that in many situations it will be
impactful whether different acculturation options
are perceived as workable, by both minority and
majority members, and more research is needed to
determine how the perceived feasibility of different
 
 
 
Essentialist
 beliefs
 
Discrepancy
 
(Demand for/Perceived possibility 
of culture adoption)
 
Prejudice
 
.40 ***  .50 ***  
.61 ***  
 
.39 ***  
Figure 2. The discrepancy between what is perceived as
possible and what is demanded mediates the effect of
essentialist beliefs on prejudice. Displayed are beta weights.
The values in italics pertain to the analysis which incorporates
two predictors.
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acculturation choices impacts on intergroup rela-
tions in minority–majority contexts.
Thirdly, few efforts have been made in the past
to combine research on essentialist beliefs about
national groups and acculturation choices
(although see Bastian and Haslam, 2008). At the
heart of both research traditions is a concern with
the relations between minority and majority
groups. The two topics are therefore inherently
related, and we hope that this paper can help to
stimulate further integrative approaches. As a next
step, it would for example be interesting to
examine the effects of not only essentialist beliefs
about the ingroup and the perceived feasibility of
culture adoption, but also essentialist beliefs about
minority outgroups and, for example, the per-
ceived feasibility of a rejection of culture main-
tenance. Just as ingroup essentialism seems to
inform majority members’ beliefs about whether
minority members can adopt the majority culture,
one might speculate that essentialism attributed to
the minority group might impact on the degree to
which minority members are perceived to be able
to reject and shed their original culture. Future
research could usefully measure essentialism
attributed to minority and majority groups simul-
taneously, to assess their impact on both the
perceived feasibility of culture adoption and
culture maintenance.
Like all research, the current contribution has
some notable limitations that should be acknowl-
edged. The present design was correlational, with
the inherent uncertainties about the causal direc-
tion of observed effects this brings. Future
research could benefit from employing experimen-
tal designs. Also, the present research focused on
Pakistanis as one salient minority group. There is
no theoretical reason to assume that the pattern
would not generalize to other groups also, but of
course this would have to be tested.
From an applied point of view, an important
message for practitioners would be that it is
important not only to focus on how people
perceive ‘‘the other,’’ i.e., the minority outgroup,
but that one also needs to consider how people
perceive their own ingroup. Unless essentialist
notions about the ingroup are addressed, positive
messages about the outgroup are bound to be
ineffective. So, when trying to improve intergroup
attitudes, a good starting point might be not to
issue messages about ‘‘them,’’ but to instead issue
messages about ‘‘us.’’
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